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United States v. Doe,
968 F.2D 86 (D.C. CIR. 1992).
Introduction
The United States of America brought criminal charges against the defendant,
Diane Nomad, for violating a federal regulation which prohibited playing a
musical instrument in a national park at a higher than prescribed decibel level.
The District Court for the District of Columbia convicted the defendant of the
offense. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that
the government failed to carry its burden of showing that the regulation in
question was "narrowly tailored" to further the government's interest -in
preventing excessive noise in a national park.
Facts
For several days in January of 1991, Diane Nomad and other protestors
gathered in Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House, and chanted
and beat drums as a means of expressing their opposition to the bombing of Iraq
during the Gulf War. After demonstrating in this fashion for a week, the
protestors received warnings from the United States Park Police that their actions
were in violation of a federal regulation that prohibited the operation of a
musical instrument in a national park in a manner that exceeded a noise level of
60 decibels.' After three such warnings were disregarded by the protestors, the
officers arrested Nomad and the others for violating the regulation.
In the district court, Nomad argued that the regulation violated the First
Amendment because it was overbroad. She asserted that the regulation prohibited
more expressive conduct than was warranted by the government's asserted
interest in preventing excessive noise. The district court denied Nomad's motion
to dismiss, holding that the regulation was a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. Nomad was subsequently convicted of aiding and abetting the
protestors in violating the regulation and this appeal followed.
Legal Analysis
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether the decibel limit
prescribed by the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest. The court of appeals began by acknowledging that beating a
1. The regulation provides, in pertinent part:
[tihe following are prohibited... [olperating ... an audio device, such as a... musical
instrument, in a manner... [t]hat exceeds a noise level of 60 decibels measured on the
A-weighted scale at 50 feet...
36 C.F.R. § 2.12(a)(1)(i) (1991).
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drum to protest a war was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
The court also noted that it was undisputed that Lafayette Park was a "quintes-
sential public forum," and therefore, the government's ability to restrict
expressive conduct there was very limited.
The court then identified a tripartite test established by the Supreme Court to
ascertain the validity of a government regulation that restricts First Amendment
protected speech in a public forum: First, the restrictions must not refer to the
content of the regulated speech; second, the regulation must be narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest; and third, the regulation must leave
open alternative channels for communication of the information.
Applying this test to the instant case, the court first pointed out that the
regulation was facially content neutral, as it prohibited the playing of all musical
instruments with no indication of inconsistent application to particular types of
expression. Therefore the regulation passed the first prong of the test. The court
then turned to the second prong of the test, whether the regulation was narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.
Nomad asserted that the regulation was not narrowly tailored because it
severely impaired speech rights in an area where the government explicitly
permitted demonstrations because of its proximity to the White House. The
government refuted this proposition with a two part argument. First, it asserted
that it had a substantial interest in maintaining "the peaceful setting" in the
nation's parks. Second, it contended that it was not within the court's authority
to substitute its judgment for that of the Park service as to whether the regulation
at bar should be applied to Lafayette Park.
The court first stated that whether a regulation was narrowly tailored was to
be determined by a balancing test inquiring whether the restriction "burden[ed]
more speech than [was] necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests." Applying this test, the court first examined the government's asserted
interest. The court acknowledged that the government did have a legitimate
interest in maintaining a tranquil atmosphere in certain circumstances.2 However,
the court noted that Lafayette Park was not a setting in which the government
had a legitimate interest in maintaining tranquility. To the contrary, the court
pointed out that Lafayette Park was in a crowded urban area and was exposed to
passing traffic, tourists, street musicians and other disturbances endemic to the
urban setting.
The court went on to hold that while the government may justifiably impose
some sound volume restrictions upon persons in all public parks', the regulation
2. The court noted that the Supreme Court, in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988), iden-
tified the sidewalks in front of a persons home as a place in which the government has a significant
interest in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere. Doe, 968 F.2d at 88. Additionally, the court of appeals
recently recognized a substantial governmental interest in maintaining a tranquil atmosphere at the
Vietnam Veteran's Memorial wall. Doe, 968 F.2d at 88 (citing Appellee's Brief at 11).
3. In so stating, the court referred to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), in
which a noise ordinance for Manhattan's Central Park was upheld, and pointed out that the complete
absence of such regulations would inflict upon citizens all types of unwanted noise (citing City Cou-
[Vol. IV: 181
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at bar was not narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest in preventing
excessive noise in Lafayette Park. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed
out that there was no evidence in the record to support the government's choice
of a 60-decibel limit.
In further support of its conclusion the court pointed to evidence entered into
the record by defense counsel which indicated that the regulation was
substantially overbroad. This included evidence that a loud conversation may
exceed 60 decibels at 50 feet and would thus be violative of the regulation.
Defense counsel also demonstrated that generators in Lafayette Park operating at
the time of the protest created noise in violation of the regulation. Because of
this evidence produced by defense counsel, and the paucity of evidence produced
by the government, the court concluded that the government failed to carry its
burden of showing that its regulation was narrowly tailored.
Because the court held that the regulation was not narrowly tailored it was not
necessary for it to reach the third prong: whether or not the regulation left open
alternative methods of communication. The court also rejected the government's
assertion that the Park Service was better suited than the court to establish such
limits, stating that where constitutionally protected activity was involved, such
deference to the Park Service was inappropriate.4
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Nomad's
conviction, holding that the regulation was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
serve the government's interest in preventing excessive noise in Lafayette Park.
The court reached this conclusion because there was no evidence to support the
government's choice of a sixty decibel limit, and because noise in excess of sixty
decibels was not normal but appropriate, given the location of Lafayette Park.
Eric Liebman
ncil of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984)).
4. Henderson v. Lujan, No. 91-5258, slip op. at 10 (noting that court "cannot defer to [Park
Service's] judgment on the constitutional question" of "narrow tailoring")).
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